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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
cause for holding a defendant to answer for a felony would not arise, because
if one may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice it
necessarily follows that the uncorroborated testimony of such accomplice is
sufficient to establish probable cause for holding a prisoner to answer a criminal
charge.
ANTHONY FRANK.
Damages-MWhat Must Be Shown to Justify an Award of Punitive Damages
in Assault and Battery Actions.-The plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk in
front of a store next to the defendant's tavern, engaged in conversation with
one Kostiw, the owner of a dog then in the custody of the plaintiff and held
by a leash attached to her wrist. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, who
was standing nearby, without provocation, seized the dog's tail, and lifting the
animal up whirled it in the air and dropped it; that Kostiw then remonstrated
with the defendant and was struck down, and that when the plaintiff protested,
the defendant struck her, knocked her down, struck her twice again and then
seizing the leash dragged her across the walk. Plaintiff sued for assault, and the
jury found that the defendant's acts were wilful, wanton, and malicious. Judg-
ment was entered on a $2,250 verdict. The defendant contends on appeal that
the evidence showed that the incident was an unpremeditated "flare-up" affair,
and that no punitive damages should have been allowed.
On appeal, held, judgment affirmed. There was no provocation for the assault
and battery, and in view of the jury finding that the assault was wilful, wanton,
and malicious, the award of punitive damages was proper. An assault need not
be premeditated to warrant assessment of punitive damages. Karpluk v. Danis-
zewicz, 38 N.E. (2d) 823 (Ill. 1942).
Generally the courts have held that the acts of a defendant for which the
plaintiff is awarded punitive or exemplary damages must be characterized by
being wanton, wilful, reckless, or malicious. Pendleton v. Norfolk and W. Ry.
Co., 82 W.Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918); Friedman v. Jordan, 166 Va. 65, 184
S.E. 186 (1936) ; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 20 Atl. (2d) 485 (Md. 1941) ;
WILLIS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1909) p. 28; Shupack v. Gordon,
79 Conn. 298, 64 Atl. 740 (1906) ; Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 229 N.W. 869
(1930) ; May v. Baron, 329 Penn. 65, 196 Atl. 866 (1938).
Along with the principle case a typical fact situation for awarding punitive
damages is illustrated in May v. Baron, supra, where the defendant demanded
payment from the plaintiff for a bill. When the plaintiff refused to pay, the
defendant immediately struck him in the face, knocked him over in the chair
in which he was sitting, and then while he lay unconscious on the floor in a
pool of blood, kicked him several times in the abdomen. The plaintiff suffered
serious injuries as a result of which he was unable to work more than two or
three days a week. Combined damages of $4,000 were awarded in the lower
court, and in reviewing this decision on appeal the appellate court stated that,
"In view of the circumstances, the injuries sustained, the pain and suffering
endured, the loss of earning power, and the malicious and wilful character of
the assault there can be no question that the court below did not abuse its dis-
cretion in refusing to grant a new trial."
Wisconsin courts, in their instructions to juries on punitive damages, have
dwelled on the actual malice or ill will displayed in the acts of the defendant.
Nichols v. Brabaron, 94 W. 549, 69 N.W. 342 (1896), is typical. Here a man
and a woman related by marriage came to blows. "He struck her so she kicked
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him." The trial court instructed the jury that if they found that defendant "was
actuated by hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff, and that the assault, if any,
was malicious, you may award such damages, as under the evidence, you may
think proper, by way of punishment to him for the assault." The appellate court
held that this was not error, stating that long harbored ill will or vindictiveness
is not necessary to warrant punitive damages. In Lamb v. Stone, 95 Wis. 254,
70 N.W. 72 (1897), the appellate court approved a charge that if the jury should
find that the assault and battery was inflicted "under circumstances of aggrava-
tion or cruelty, with vindictiveness or malice," they could award exemplary
damages. In Di Benedetto v. Milwaukee Elec. Ryo and Light Co., 149 Wis. 566,
136 N.W. 282 (1912), the court emphasized the necessity of ill will by saying
that "the facts of vindictiveness and malice must expressly appear."
Another occasion for the awarding of punitive damages in Wisconsin is an
act of a type that is insulting. In Hooker v. Newton, 24 Wis. 292 (1869), the
court stated "if the assault was committed in an insulting manner, wilfully and
maliciously, with an intent to injure the plaintiff's feelings and disgrace him
in the estimation of the public, the jury not only might, but ought to give
punitory damages." This accent on insult is repeated in Morely and Wife v.
Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183 (1869), and Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
Exemplary damages can be mitigated or vitiated if sufficient provocation is
shown on the part of the plaintiff, as evidenced by malicious or provoking lan-
guage or conduct immediately previous to the assault. Baltimore Transit Co. v.
Faulkner, supra; Brown v. Swineford, supra.
It is always to be remembered that punitive damages are to be given "not
as a matter of right, but in the sound discretion of the jury, by way of pun-
ishing the wrongdoer, and for the protection of society and social order."
Kaklegian v. Zakarian, 123 Me. 469, 123 Atl. 900 (1924) ; Pendleton v. Norfolk
and W. Ry. Co., supra; Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52,
126 N.W. 554 (1910); Di Benedetto v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. and Light Co.,
supra.
Premeditation on the part of the defendant to act as he did is not an essen-
tial element for the awarding of punitive damages. However, a review of the
decisions will establish that most courts require a finding of malice in the acts
of the defendant. Baker v. Carrington, 138 Va. 22, 120 S.E. 856 (1924) ; Ransom
v. McDermott, 215 Ia. 594, 246 N.W. 266 (1933) ; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulk-
ner, supra. Malice need not be express. Shoemaker v. Sonju, 15 N.D. 518, 108
N.W. 42 (1906) ; Baker v. Carrington, supra. In the Shoemaker case, supra, a
sixty-four year old man was engaged in conversation with another person in a
hotel when the defendant, without warning, grabbed him and threw him on the
floor, injuring him severely. There was no evidence of any drinking. The de-
fendant testified that he had no enemies. In granting exemplary damages the
court pointed out that malice which will authorize a recovery of exemplary dam-
ages may be actual or presumed. "Malice which is presumed, or malice in law,
as distinguished from malice in fact," is not personal hate or ill will of one
person toward another; it refers to that state of mind which is reckless of law
and of the legal rights of a citizen in a person's conduct toward him.
The Wisconsin court has given much attention to the question of malice.
In a case where the agent of a hotel accused a female guest of being immorally
present in the room of another man, and where the court was confronted by the
problem of what constituted malice for the award of punitive damages, the court
concluded that, "An exact or precise definition of the technical term in the
law of the 'malice' that must be shown in order that there be a basis for puni-
1942]
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tory damages in addition to compensatory damages for a breach of some duty
by a defendant when such is the proper subject of an action in tort is hard to
find and still harder to frame. It is evident, however, from all the authorities
that in any particular case, not in and of itself a malicious action, in order that
punitory damages may be assessed something must be shown over and above
the mere breach of duty for which compensatory damages may be given. That
is, a showing of bad intent deserving punishment, or something in the nature
of ill will towards the person injured, or a wanton ,deliberate disregard of the
particular duty then being breached, or that which resembles gross as distin-
guished from ordinary negligence." Meshane v. Second Street Co. and others,
197 Wis. 382, 222 N.W. 320 (1928); See also Lowe v. Ring, 123 Wis. 107, 101
N.W. 381 (1904).
Best interests of society often determine what the decision of the court will
be in granting exemplary damages, and also govern the amount. Where a con-
ductor on a railroad made indecent proposals and indecently touched a woman
passenger the Missouri court allowed the plaintiff $500 compensatory and $1,500
punitive damages. Flynn v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 190 S.W. 371
(Mo. 1916). The court noted the relationship of passenger and carrier, a con-
ductor's obligation to his passengers, a woman's reluctance to protest and dis-
grace herself in a car full of strangers, and her inability to help herself, being
confined in a car. In the case of Ransom v. McDermott, supra, the defendant,
a married man of eighty years, three times unsuccessfully attacked the plaintiff,
a married woman, aged twenty-seven, in an attempt to have intercourse with
her. She was pregnant at the time, and offered as much resistance as she could
in her condition. There was no measure of physical harm done to her, but the
court allowed $500 actual damages while the punitive damages were assessed
at four times the compensatory damages, or $2,000. Where a defendant was a
trained acrobat and grabbed the plaintiff, a woman, by her wrist, and threw
her over a stove and onto the floor when she attempted to hold him until the
police should arrive, the court awarded exemplary damages, declaring that the
assault was wanton and reckless. Malley v. Lane, 97 Conn. 133, 115 AtI. 674
(1921).
Although the courts require some finding of the nature considered above
before an award of punitive damages will be made, the amount of the award
in many cases is governed by considerations such as those expressed in Pendle-
ton v. W. Ry. Co., supra. As a result of a fracas between a conductor and a
passenger, the passenger was injured when the conductor beat him. The lower
court found that the actual damages of the passenger amounted to $557.50 while
the exemplary damages were set at $5,000. The higher court reversed the deci-
sion of the lower court because it thought that punitive damages amounting to
approximately ten times the compensatory damages were too much. The court
stated that after first establishing the prerequisites for any grant of punitory
damages, that is, that the assault made upon the plaintiff be wanton, wilful,
reckless, or malicious, the jury should take into account that "The exemplary
damage should bear some proportion to the actual damage sustained. . . . The
character of the injury inflicted should in some degree be considered by the
jury in measuring the punishment to be meted out to the defendants.... Other
elements enter into the ascertainment of damages, such as the character and
reputation of the parties, their social standing in society and their financial
ability. The object of such punishment is to deter the defendants from commit-
ting like offenses in the future, and this, it may be said, is one of the objects
of all punishment, and we recognize that it would require, perhaps, a larger
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fine to have this deterrent effect upon one of large means than it would upon
one of ordinary means granting that the same malignant spirit was possessed
by each."
This inclination of the court to give weight to social standing, wealth or
other relationships of the parties is borne out by the case of Trogden v. Terry,
172 N.C. 575, 90 S.E. 582 (1916). While the plaintiff was having dinner in a
hotel dining room, the defendant came up to him with a written retraction
of a statement that plaintiff had previously made, and demanded that the plain-
tiff sign it. The defendant held his walking cane in a threatening position, and
in answer to the plaintiff's question, "What if I don't sign it?", he replied, "I
will whip the hell out of you." After the plaintiff signed, the defendant called
him a "damned contemptible puppy." For this the plaintiff was awarded $1,000
for actual damages and $1,500 as exemplary damages. The court declared that
"there was abundant evidence of malice upon which the jury in their discretion
were warranted in inflicting punitive damages."
PHILP W. CROEN.
Executors and Administrators-Grounds for Refusing to Appoint Executor
Nominated in a Will--A testator died and left 3 children; John Svacina, Mrs.
Clara Eatman and Ella Svacina. Ella, a resident of Florida, came to Wisconsin
and immediately took possession of the decedant's personal property. John and
Clara then filed a petition for probate of the will; and upon the same date,
Ella, being named in the decedent's will as the sole executrix, filed a petition for
her appointment as executrix thereof. Later, the surviving heirs filed objection
to the appointment of Ella as executrix on the ground that Ella was not "legally
competent" to be appointed by the court as executrix. Upon the petition of John
and Clara, the court issued letters of special administration to a trust company.
Following this, a hearing was held upon the objections to the appointment of
Ella as executrix. The lower court held that there was a discretion in the
county court to refuse to appoint a nonresident nominee, by interpretation of
Sec 324.35 Wis. STAT. (1941), which permits the removal of a nonresident
executor.
It was held, on appeal, that mere nonresidence of the executor named in the
will does not disqualify him, and that the court must appoint him if all the
other requirements are satisfied. The power of the court to remove the executor
on the basis of nonresidence applies only to removal, and cannot be used by the
court as grounds for refusing to appoint the executor named in the will. In re
Svacina's Estate, 1 N.W. (2d) 780 (Wis. 1942).
Although the executor is nominated by the will, the executor exists by virtue
of the appointment by the court. Davenport v. Sandeman, 204 Iowa 927, 216
N.W. 55 (1895). It is generally accepted that the courts have no discretion in
issuing letters testamentary to the party named in the will. Unless the nominee
is expressly disqualified by statute, or if such discretion is created by statute,
the court cannot reject the person named. Will of Zartner, 183 Wis. 506, 198
N.W. 363 (1924). The qualifications of an executor are statutory in Wisconsin.
"When a will shall have been admitted to probate the court shall issue letters
testamentary thereon to the person named executor therein, if he is legally
competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond when and as required by law."
Wis. STAT. (1941), Sec. 310.12. The power to name an executor to admin-
ister an estate is coextensive with the power to devise or bequeath the estate
itself. State ex Rel. Lauridsen v. Superior Court, 179 Wash. 198, 37 P. (2nd) 209,
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